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A Functional Approach to Violent 
Radicalization. Building a Systemic 
Model Based on a Real Case 
 
Aproximación funcional a la radicalización violenta.  
Propuesta de un modelo sistémico basado en un caso real 
 
MIGUEL PECO 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain 
 
ABSTRACT: A paradox in the study of violent radicalization is that while each of the empirical findings 
can be explained with multiple theories, very few theories can explain a relevant number of these findings 
simultaneously. This paper conducts a functional behavior assessment of violent radical behavior, 
investigating the factors responsible for its initial learning and subsequent maintenance. Specifically, a 
model of radicalization is proposed that can explain a wide range of observed phenomena, accommodate 
apparent exceptions, and obtain testable consequences. It also challenges some firmly rooted ideas, as the 
alleged existence of aggressive influence practices, or brainwashing. Finally, the model can also provide 
valuable predictions for subsequent research, such as those related to the reversibility of the process of 
radicalization. 
KEYWORDS: Radicalization, de-radicalization, terrorism, functional behavior assessment, cognitive-
behavioral approach. 
 
RESUMEN: Una paradoja en el estudio de la radicalización violenta es que, si bien cada uno de los 
hallazgos empíricos puede explicarse desde múltiples teorías, son escasas las teorías capaces de explicar 
varios de estos hallazgos simultáneamente. En este trabajo se aplica el análisis funcional de la conducta a 
la conducta radical violenta, buscando los factores que pudieran estar detrás de su adquisición y 
mantenimiento. En concreto, se propone un modelo de radicalización que puede explicar un amplio 
abanico de fenómenos observados, acomodar aparentes excepciones y obtener consecuencias 
contrastables. También permite desafiar algunas ideas firmemente arraigadas, como la supuesta existencia 
de prácticas de influencia agresiva, o lavados de cerebro. Finalmente, el modelo permite obtener 
predicciones de gran valor para la investigación posterior, como las relacionadas con la reversibilidad del 
proceso de radicalización.   
PALABRAS CLAVE: Radicalización, des-radicalización, terrorismo, análisis funcional de la conducta, 
enfoque cognitivo-conductual.  
 
Recibido: 1 de febrero de 2016.  





64                                                                          Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In studying the phenomenon of violent radicalization, there is a broad consensus on 
issues such as the progressiveness of the process, the low proportion of radical 
individuals who eventually become terrorists, and the importance of bonds of friendship 
and camaraderie, amongst others. Similarities have also been noted between the 
processes emerging in different contexts of radicalization, independent of its associated 
ideologies or inclinations (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent 
Radicalization, 2008). Much of the research conducted in this regard has been based on 
the social sciences, trying to clarify the factors that might be related to the phenomenon. 
This has led to the development of many theories and the proposal of some conceptual 
models (Borum, 2011). 
The paradox, however, is that while each of the empirical findings related to violent 
radicalization can be explained with multiple theories, very few theories can explain a 
relevant number of these findings simultaneously. In fact, very few proposed models of 
radicalization are able to explain a wide range of observable phenomena and, 
simultaneously, Figure out contrastable consequences. 
This paper is a continuation of “A Cognitive-Behavioral Approach to Violent 
Radicalization, Based on a Real Case” (Peco, 2014), which conducted an analysis of a 
real context of radicalization based on the practices of a known terrorist organization 
and its political arm. As described in the article, this context was characterized at the 
time by the absence of reasons that normally correlate with the use of violence to reach 
political purposes. Notwithstanding this, paradoxically, it was also characterized by its 
relative success in radicalizing supporters and generating violence. These features make 
this case a particularly suitable context to identify the key factors that could be involved 
in the process of radicalization of certain individuals. 
This paper will use the empirical evidence gathered in the previous work to build a 
comprehensive and coherent model of radicalization. The first step in constructing this 
model will be the definition of the structural elements involved in the process of 
radicalization. Next will be the proposal of the effects caused by the interaction of these 
elements. Finally, it will be the definition of the main process and its dependent 
variable, as well as the variations thereof as a result of the individual's interaction with 
the aforementioned effects. All the above will be traced through a flowchart with 
feedback mechanisms that control the value of that variable. 
As a coherent body of hypotheses, the model will be tested in two ways. On the one 
hand, for its ability to both explain a wide range of observable situations within 
radicalization environments and accommodate particular cases.  On the other hand, the 
model will be indirectly tested for its ability to produce conclusions that can be 
contrasted in a reasonable manner 
To finish this introduction, it is necessary to highlight one of the underlying 
assumptions for this model. Unlike other types of common violent behavior where 
benefits for the individual are derived from external rewards, benefits for the violent 
radical are primarily internal. Militancy and subsequent violent activities in the radical 
group can provide internal rewards through feelings of pride, acceptance, belonging, 
achievement, etc.  In the context of a developed society, these rewards are easier to 
attain this way rather than through other individual or social activities that normally 
require a higher level of effort and perseverance. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This model was developed with a cognitive-behavioral approach as well as functional 
behavior assessment (FBA). Regarding the first, it is necessary to point out that radical 
violent behavior is seen as a learned behavior, and, therefore, its acquisition, 
maintenance and possible extinction are subject to the principles of Learning Theory. In 
a cognitive behavioral context, behavior does not only include visible motor behavior; 
thoughts, feelings and attitudes associated with that motor behavior are also considered 
as a part of the individual’s response, which is elicited under specific stimuli. As a 
result, responses and behavior in general are considered to manifest themselves through 
three separate systems: cognitive, physiologic and motor (Lang, 1968). 
From a functional approach, behavior is analyzed in terms of response to specific 
stimulatory conditions. However, the individual´s response towards a given stimulatory 
condition may not always be the same. According to Operant Conditioning paradigm, 
responses may vary in magnitude and frequency depending on the consequences of past 
responses (Skinner, 1987). An FBA is intended to precisely identify the circumstances 
in which the individual´s behavior was acquired and why it is presently maintained. The 
axiom of the FBA is that if a behavior persists, even though it is not an adaptive 
behavior, it is because that behavior is carrying out a function that translates into 
benefits for the individual
1
. Technically speaking, it is said that the behavior is being 
reinforced, because otherwise it ought to have disappeared already, either by extinction 
or punishment. 
An additional advantage provided by the use of an FBA is the avoidance of moral 
assessments on individual’s violent acts, which are frequent reactions when dealing with 
very sensitive topics like this one. Violent behavior carried out by a radical activist is 
considered non-adaptive strictly for functional reasons. On the one hand, the likelihood 
for an activist to reach his declared objectives by using violence is very little. On the 
other hand, the likelihood that violence will be followed by aversive consequences, like 
prison penalties for long periods of time, is high. These reasons, among others, make 
radical violent behavior in developed societies a non-adaptive approach, and there is no 
need to take into consideration ethical or moral aspects, which are reserved for other 
disciplines.  
An FBA also allows for the definition of the role of beliefs that are normally 
associated with the process of radicalization. From a cognitive-behavioral point of view, 
those beliefs mark the difference between radical violent behavior and other contexts of 
organized violence, e.g. those linked to common crime. However, functionally 
speaking, there is little difference among beliefs based on politics, religion or other 
corporative imagery. As a matter of fact, the proposed model of radicalization can be 
easily adapted to other kinds of violence, e.g. violence conducted by some gangs of 
youths. Finally, it is necessary to remark that the process of radicalization constitutes a 
relevant subject of study because sometimes it encompasses violence, and not because 
of the more or less extreme way that a given individual understands or professes those 
beliefs.   
In building the model, the following classic theories are used to explain specific 
sequences: Social Learning (Bandura, 1977), Operant Conditioning (Skinner, 1938), 
and Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Although using all these theories to 
explain the same phenomenon is not an orthodox approach from the point of view of the 
cognitive-behavioral paradigm, this inconvenience is balanced through the use of 
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concepts that in general are more familiar for most of the readers. It is also worth 
mentioning that only strictly necessary theories have been used, despite the fact that 
there exit a number of more recent ones that can explain certain aspects of the process 
of radicalization. This approach contributes additionally to the simplicity of the 
proposal, and is fully in line with the principle of parsimony.  
This last criterion also justifies the absence of references to other models of 
radicalization, which might seem partially similar to the one here proposed.
2
 Although 
the findings of those models are acknowledged, they are not necessary either to 
elaborate or to support the present one. It is also not intended to conduct a comparative 
study among different theories on radicalization –that would perhaps be an endeavor for 
other authors, should the case arise- but simply to show a coherent model, made by 
using a different approach that is, above all, based on a very particular context of 
radicalization. 
 
PROPOSING A MODEL OF RADICALIZATION 
Structure 
The model structure consists of three basic elements (Figure 1). First is the clandestine 
organization, which becomes the reference of radicalization for some individuals. This 
organization operates on a relatively established physical or virtual infrastructure; 
employs, justifies and legitimizes the use of violence to achieve their goals; makes use 
of terror; and recruits new members to ensure its survival and expansion. 
Second is the radical group, which operates within the bounds of legality and becomes 
the great intermediary between the clandestine organization and the social environment. 
This group carries out a series of actions aimed at supporting that organization, at 
recruiting and mentoring its own militants, as well as influencing the social environment 
where it is deployed. Specifically, key activities conducted by the radical group that 
potentially relate to individuals’ radicalization are: 
 Organizing and controlling protest activities and recreational events. 
 Harassing and targeting political opponents. 
 Producing and disseminating a discourse that justifies and glorifies violent 
activities carried out by the clandestine organization. 
 Encouraging and organizing low-intensity violent activities. 
 Organizing and structuring activities relevant to members’ militancy. 
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And third, there is the social environment where the radical group is deployed, which is 
directly influenced by the group itself and also by the clandestine organization. Within 
this social environment, an important role is played by the sympathizers, i.e. an 
undefined group of people who get along with that organization in a spontaneous 
manner; that share to some extent its ideology, objectives and means to achieve them; 
and that may even achieve some degree of informal organization. Some of these 
sympathizers can start radicalizing gradually, having the option to integrate themselves 
into the radical group as militants, and even into the clandestine organization as 
members. 
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Interaction 
Regular activities undertaken by the clandestine organization and the radical group 
create a series of effects in their social environments. Before going to their description, 
two key assumptions in this regard should be noted. These assumptions are backed by 
the empirical evidence gathered in the analysis of the real case this model is based on 
(Peco, 2014). 
The first one is that the combination clandestine organization-radical group can cause 
fascination and attraction among certain sectors of the population. When it comes to 
understanding the process of radicalization, it is a serious mistake to consider the radical 
group only as a group of activists willing to carry out protests by violent means.  Rather, 
it is necessary to put oneself in the sympathizer/potential activist’s shoes and view the 
radical group as a clear and structured way of life that offers the possibility of taking 
part in an exciting and transcendent project, such as changing a society. Thus, 
membership in these groups might be for some individuals a great shortcut to a mirage 
of self-realization, especially if there are no alternative routes to achieve this latter. 
The second assumption, closely related to the first one, is that militancy in the radical 
group, including the use of violence, is a source of internal satisfaction for the 
individual. Internal satisfactions such as perceiving the admiration of others, a feeling of 
acceptance in the group, high self-esteem, or even consummating revenge for pretended 
offenses, can be as motivating as material rewards like money or other benefits.
3
 The 
expectation of achieving any of these satisfactions can provide an explanation of why 
some individuals come to embrace the path of violence in the absence of a clear motive, 
with all the disadvantages that an eventual step into hiding mean in terms of 
deprivation.  
The three effects considered relevant in this model of radicalization are: attraction, 
neutralization of social rejection, and environments conducive to violent radicalization. 
Attraction. The clandestine organization, together with the radical group, creates an 
effect of fascination and attraction among certain sectors of the population. This effect 
causes some individuals to approach the radical group, start participating in its 
activities, and get exposed to its influence. A key feature to achieve the effect of 
attraction is the radical group’s ability to organize, control and offer a wide range of 
activities, including both protest and recreational events. Thus, the whole package of 
activities within a radical group can be exciting and offers an alternative to conventional 
life. Control of a broad spectrum of activities by the group, along with attracting the 
individual to its influence, also lessens the opportunity to receive other influences 
competitive with extremism. 
Neutralization of social rejection.  The terror created by the clandestine organization, 
once optimized by the radical group through harassing and targeting political opponents, 
is able to neutralize a social response that, according to the results of surveys and other 
studies, could be otherwise much more widespread and forceful. (Peco, 2011; Peco et 
al, 2013). Neutralization of social rejection leaves the way open for the appeal of both 
the group and the radical organization. This lack of external feedback may contribute to 
the radical militant’s illusion of seeing his movement as representative of the 
surrounding society, or even its vanguard. 
Environments conducive to violent radicalization. These are situations created by the 
radical group where favorable conditions exist for individuals to develop and deepen 
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their process of radicalization. These environments are formed by the confluence of 
three activities.  First, development and dissemination of a discourse of justification and 
glorification of violence, which exposes the militant to models of conduct to imitate and 
also provides justification for violent acts. Second, encouragement and organization of 
low-intensity violent activities, which provides an opportunity for militants to start 
exercising violence in a progressive and safe manner. And third, organization itself and 
other militancy-related activities, which expose individuals to favorable contingencies 
to consolidate the recently acquired violent behavior. 
 
Main process and dependent variable 
This model considers violent radicalization a learning process –in the sense of the 
Learning Theory- of patterns of violent behavior by the individual. These patterns 
include consistent cognitive and behavioral components, and refer to a given ideology 
and/or belief. Similarly, de-radicalization is the process by which the individual 
abandons previously-learned patterns of violent behavior. According to the Learning 
Theory, this latter process can occur either by the appearance of punitive circumstances 
(punishment) or lack of rewards (extinction). In this model, the process of radicalization 
is represented through a cyclical flow diagram, which includes the following phases: 
approach, participation in group activities, radicalization itself, and potential de-
radicalization. 
For the purposes of this model, the level of individual radicalization (IR) is the 
variable that, in general, shows the likelihood that a given individual  carries out violent 
behavior, which is representative of his/her radicalization environment. 
The effect of attraction provokes the approximation of sympathizers, i.e. increases 
the likelihood that some of these individuals start participating in the activities of the 
radical group and get exposed to its influence. 
From here on, the process of radicalization, from a cognitive-behavioral perspective, 
can be explained by a combination of the following classical paradigms and/or theories:  
Social Learning (Bandura, 1977), Operant Conditioning (Skinner, 1938) and Cognitive 
Dissonance (Festinger, 1957).
4
 The aforementioned environments conducive to violent 
radicalization contain the necessary conditions for the processes described in these 
paradigms to occur.  
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Violent behavior can be initially acquired by observational learning, through 
participation of the individual in group activities and subsequent expectation of reward 
in the form of feelings of pride, acceptance, belonging, achievement, etc. From here on, 
two different paths are proposed, which are based on two extreme theoretical situations 
that define the range of real situations where the individual may be involved. The first 
path starts with the exposure to a discourse of justification and glorification of violence. 
This exposure prompts the individual to internalize the arguments provided by that 
discourse. As a result, the cognitive component of the incipient violent behavior 
increases, exceeds the behavioral (motor) component, and dissonance between thought 
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and action appears. Since there is an expectation of reward, which was obtained through 
observational learning, this dissonance tends to be resolved upwards, i.e. the behavioral 
component tends to equalize the cognitive one, and not the other way around. The 
external conditions are suitable for this purpose, since activities involving episodes of 
low-intensity violence provide the opportunity to implement the ideas previously 
acquired in a safe and suitable manner. The result is an increase in visible violent 
behavior; up to equalize the cognitive component. From the individual’s point of view, 
ideas and actions are already consistent. Therefore, in this way violent action 
accommodates new ideas in a kind of rational manner. 
The second path starts with individual’s exposure to situations of low-intensity 
violence. It is shown in Figure 2 with a dashed line. Small violent actions, not too far 
from the individual’s beliefs, can be elicited merely by peer pressure, local action-
reaction dynamics, fear, or other causes. Once these actions are carried out, the 
behavioral component exceeds the cognitive one, and dissonance appears. Since an 
expectation of reward exists, as was the case in the previous path, this dissonance tends 
to be resolved upwards. The external conditions are also fit for this purpose, since 
violent discourse provides the arguments the individual needs to justify his own violent 
actions. Thus, the individual assimilates violent discourse, and the result is an increase 
of violence-related cognitions. The new individual’s thinking adapts the previous action, 
and both become consistent. 
In any case, once the dissonance is reduced, emerging violent behaviors and 
cognitions will adjust to each other. Then, they will be followed by recognition from 
other militants, and a feeling of internal satisfaction will appear. The interaction that 
occurs between individuals during activities related to militancy provides the 
appropriate setting for such rewards to become reinforcements of the violent behavior, 
and therefore increases the likelihood that behavior will be repeated in the future. In 
short, what began as an incipient violent behavior becomes consolidated behavior. 
In summary, the initial learning mechanism of emerging violent behavior may be 
observational learning. After that, the escalation in intensity and frequency can be 
explained by the upwards adjustment between cognitive and behavioral elements. In any 
case, this escalation is driven by a previously-acquired expectation of reward. Finally, 
continuance of violent behavior can be explained by the primacy of potentially 
reinforcing contingencies within radical environments. 
The process is repeated cyclically, thereby leaving the individual in the midst of a 
spiral of radicalization in which thoughts, feelings, and actions match each other 
following an upward trend. Ethical barriers concerning the use of violence, if any, fall 
one after another. The individual immersed in the process of radicalization self-justifies 
his new lifestyle as a result of his commitment to a cause. Violence is clearly seen as a 
legitimate way to achieve an idyllic end situation, and he sees himself as one of those 
chosen to carry out such a transcendental task.
5
 
According to this model, the individual enters a radicalization loop. Once immersed in 
this process, it is very difficult to leave. Furthermore, for some individuals there is no 
other way to enjoy internal satisfactions like those provided by the radical group: a clear 
objective and structured way of life, self-esteem, feeling of belonging, friendship, etc. 
At some point in this escalation, he may be recruited by the organization and go into 
hiding. From this moment on, for the purposes of this model, there is little chance of 
turning back, and the individual gets increasingly involved in the regular activities of 
the radical organization. 
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Neutralizing the effectiveness of aversive stimuli 
It is necessary to stress the feeling of security that the radical group provides to the 
individual who carries out low-intensity violent activities. This feeling is provided not 
only through objective physical aspects such as providing coverage, promoting mass 
action, executing detailed planning, etc., but also through subjective perceptions. Thus, 
the radical group could be neutralizing the effectiveness of these aversive stimuli by 
creating a perception of impunity via highlighting police errors and contradictions in the 
legal system, threatening and targeting law enforcers, creating supportive networks for 
convicts, or promoting a belief in a future withdrawal of legal measures by the 
authorities, for instance. This supposed neutralization of the effectiveness of aversive 
stimuli into the radical group can explain why observational learning sometimes does 
not work in reverse, i.e. punishing violent behavior through the expectation of detention 
by the police, or fear of possible criminal responsibilities in the future.  
In addition to the above, and when speaking of contexts of radicalization inserted in 
democratic societies, a clarification must be made regarding the security and protection 
provided to all citizens by the rule of law.  Under these conditions, a member of a 
radical group does not normally risk his life or his physical integrity. On the contrary, 
he may carry out protest activities, and even use violence, from the base of a normal life 
where his basic needs are met. 
 
Stabilization and de-radicalization 
In order to approach the process holistically, it is better to set the behavioral view aside 
and focus on motivation. Thus, the process of radicalization can be considered as being 
driven by the imbalance between motivational and deterring factors of violent behavior, 
in favor of the former. This imbalance, in turn, is caused by the amount of motivating 
factors existing in the radicalization loop, while the deterring factors are inexistent or 
merely neutralized. In principle, theoretically, while this imbalance is maintained, the 
individual will increase his violent behavior. 
However, it is reasonable to assume this imbalance is not constant, and the more the 
individual enters into the process of radicalization, the more relevant the deterring 
factors become with respect to the motivational ones. In fact, the further the individual 
advances in the process, the greater the risks he has to face are, and the more the 
comforts of modern societies he is forced to give up. Thus, it might be a gamble too 
high for most of them to continue on the path of radicalization with the prospect of 
finally going into hiding. 
This idea can be represented in the model by introducing a loop of de-radicalization.  
In case of factors incompatible with the process of radicalization progressively appear -
which will be discussed later on- the individual may begin decreasing his IR and 
eventually reach a balance around a given level. At this point, the flow in the diagram 
will adopt a cyclic trajectory in the shape of an "eight". 
 
DISCUSSION 
The validity of this model is supported in two ways. First, because of its ability to 
explain a wide range of observable situations that happen within radicalization 
environments, as well as to adapt to cases that, in principle, could be viewed as 
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exceptions. And second, it can also be sustained directly due to its ability to reach 
deductions that can be contrasted in a reasonable manner taking into account the 
particular circumstances of the phenomenon of radicalization. 
 
Ability to adapt observable facts and apparent exceptions 
The model allows for the deduction of aspects such as the progressivity of the process 
of radicalization or the importance of the individual’s ties of friendship and 
camaraderie. The model also provides an explanation for the empirical data on the low 
proportion of radicals who eventually become terrorists. This is due to the growing 
prominence of the deterring factors as the process progresses. Finally, the model also 
takes away some relevance from the classic question of why some people become 
terrorists and others do not. A proper influx of people to the process is sufficient 
condition to perpetuate the phenomenon, no matter who of them will eventually join the 
organization or merely continue contributing to the group’s activities.  
The model also applies to cases of individuals who, if they could, would carry out 
violent behavior at their initial involvement with the radical group. This conduct may be 
motivated, for instance, by an extreme fanaticism, by a history of learning violence in 
other areas, or even by suffering some kind of ailment. In all these cases, part of the 
process of radicalization is already done. Then, the radical group will provide the 
individual with supporting arguments for the use of violence, as well as the resources, 
structure and leadership needed to carry out such violent activities. This way, the group 
will allow the individual to adjust his manifest behavior to his previous convictions, or 
vice-versa. In short, the process of radicalization will progress more quickly.
6
 
Anger is usually considered as a causal factor of radicalization, which needs some 
clarification. This feeling can be found in many members of radical organizations and in 
some circumstances can become a catalyst of radicalization. The problem, however, lies 
in considering anger solely as a natural reaction unleashed by grievances felt by the 
individual, either directly orvicariously, e.g. excessive reactions from security forces or 
supposed repressive political conditions. In this respect, it is necessary to point out that 
anger can appear also as a result of cognitive activity, either induced or modulated by 
the imagery of the radical group, and subsequently become subject to contingencies of 
reinforcement. In other words, anger can also be the result of a learning process and, 
therefore, a consequence of the individual´s activity.  
 
Deduction of consequences: Is it possible to break the process and consequent de-
radicalization of the individual? 
According to this model, radical violent behavior may diminish or even disappear 
through a number of mechanisms. First, through a process of extinction caused by a lack 
of expectation of reward within the group.
7
 This can occur, for instance, in case the 
individual stops receiving reinforcements from other activists and leaders. 
Second, by the appearance of external, aversive stimuli that may become punishments 
under certain circumstances, according to the Learning Theory. Applying this logic, 
promoting citizens to freely express their rejection towards violence might be one of the 
most powerful ways to reverse the process of radicalization. This is because that 
rejection constitutes an aversive stimulus itself, it directly counteracts the discourse of 
justification and glorification of violence, and because of the synergy with other 
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measures to promote de-radicalization.  This creates a virtuous circle where citizens 
would be able to express themselves freely and support the measures taken by the 
authorities, at the same time that the radical group would weaken. 
Third, violent behavior could also disappear through the successful competition of 
other activities that may become sources of rewards for the individual. For instance, 
encouraging and involving the radical in activities worth of merit, self-esteem or social 
recognition from the community, for example, could re-direct the individual’s 
expectation of reward from violent activities to more constructive endeavors. It is, 
therefore, worth exploring alternatives to the process of radicalization as a necessary 
complement to either leaving it or avoiding any backsliding. 
The last two mechanisms can be found in Figure 1, at the detour of factors 
incompatible with the process of radicalization. Actually, all the identified mechanisms 
affect the individual’s expectations, either that related to the aversive consequences of 
his/her behavior or to the possibility of losing opportunities for reward. The expectation 
of the individual becomes therefore a key variable in controlling the level of 
radicalization. Manipulating the factors that influence this variable could theoretically 
modify and redirect the process towards the de-radicalization loop. 
Finally, it should be noted that the aforementioned actions coincide substantially with 
measures already planned or even implemented by the authorities in order to combat the 
phenomenon of radicalization. Among these measures, those included in the EU 
strategy for combating radicalization should be highlighted (Council of the European 
Union, 2005), as well as others carried out as a result of applying national legislation, 
e.g. the Organic Law 6/2002 in Spain. This coincidence of results provides credibility 
for and represents an endorsement of the model presented here, and therefore suggests 
that it could be effectively applied to a wide range of contexts of radicalization. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed model shows a feasible, consistent path by which some individuals can 
become violent radicals. Arguments supporting the validity of the model come from its 
ability to explain observable facts, such as the progressiveness of the process of 
radicalization, the scarce percentage of individuals that finally become terrorists, and 
the possibility to be applied to other individuals that are already violent for other 
reasons. On the other hand, arguments in favor of its usefulness can be drawn from its 
ability to identify critical sequences from which the process of radicalization can be 
interrupted or even reverted. This should allow for the development and implementation 
of both preventive and corrective action plans with a solid scientific foundation.  
The model also challenges some firmly-rooted beliefs about the process of 
radicalization. In this model, individual radicalization is seen as a learning process of 
violent behavior, accepted by the individual and influenced by external factors. While 
this influence from external factors is important, it is actually the individual who 
radicalizes himself by increasing his violent behavior and changing his thoughts, beliefs 
and feelings. All of this is done under the motivating drive of an expectation of internal 
reward. Therefore, it is not necessary to resort to aggressive influences, indoctrination, 
etc. to explain why some individuals become violent radicals. In other words, although 
it is true that the individual´s leading role in his/her own process of radicalization is 
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compatible with supposed influence practices undertaken by more-radicalized 
individuals, these practices might be actually less effective than they appear. 
Finally, the model also suggests that the appearance of spontaneous sources of 
radicalization, with a potential to become organized groups, is a feasible phenomenon. 
In fact, according to the model, only three conditions are required for the process of 
radicalization to start: first, the belief that carrying out violent actions in a relatively safe 
manner is something feasible; second, the possibility of interacting with other comrades 
in a way that expectations can be shared and encouraged among each other; and third, 
the presence of an appropriate reference that can provide guidance, identity and 
narratives. The first two conditions are not unique to radical groups; instead, they can be 
found in other environments where informal relationships take place. And as for the 
third condition, the fact is that guidance, identity and narratives are available today in a 
direct manner, without intermediaries, thanks to the possibilities of information 
technologies. Thus, once the incipient source of radicalization appears, it is relatively 
easy to create an organization that is able to protect its individuals and allows them to 
pursue at least mid-term goals. In short, the phenomenon of collective radicalization can 
appear spontaneously if and when a minimum of given conditions happen, and can 
evolve over time into more complex systems. 
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1 It should be noted that the term “adaptive” has a relative meaning. Throwing homemade bombs to 
security forces, for instance, is a non-adaptive behavior in a conventional civilian environment because 
such behavior is unacceptable for most of the citizens and normally provokes both moral rejection and 
legal punishment. However, since it is well established that such behavior happens regularly in certain 
radical environments, it is possible that this behavior is adaptive to some individuals.The FBA will aim to 
discover precisely why that behavior is kept in an individual’s repertoire in given circumstances, despite 
the fact that it is not adaptive to most of subjects and/or circumstances.  
2
 For instance, that of Kruglanskyet al. (2014) 
3
 Maslow´s Motivation Theory (1943) is very useful when studying behavior in environments such as 
developed societies, in which basic human needs are mostly covered. As Maslow argues, there are five 
groups of basic needs: physiological, safety, social, esteem, and self-actualization. According to Maslow, 
people are perpetually willing to satisfy these needs. Furthermore, we tend to satisfy some of them before 
others. In other words, following our “devourer” quest, we are perpetually looking for needs to be 
satisfied, beyond those we have just accounted for. 
4
The Operant Conditioning paradigm (Skinner, 1938) states that the individual’s response to given stimuli 
varies according to the consequences the same response provoked in the past. Thus, delivering a pleasant  
outcome as a result of the individual releasing a free behavior is likely to provoke that behavior to be 
repeated in the future. In contrast, delivering an unpleasant outcome (aversive stimulus) associated to the 
same behavior is to provoke a decrease in the likelihood for that conduct to be released in the future. In 
both cases, withdrawing these stimuli is to reduce or increase, respectively, the likelihood for that 
behavior to be repeated in the future. Bandura, in his Social Learning Theory (1977) remarked the 
possibility of learning to occur indirectly, by observing other’s behavior and its consequences, through 
what he called observational learning. Finally, Festinger (1957) suggested that incoherence between 
individual’s manifest behavior and the moral assessment of that behavior carried out by the individual 
himself/herself (dissonance), is to provoke aversive stress, and, therefore, an inner drive to reduce such 
stress  will appear. In Festinger´s experiment, that dissonance reduction was observed when the 
individuals modified the moral assessment of their own behavior, from negative to positive, after having 
released it voluntarily and consciously.  
5
 This proposal is fully compatible with the widely known Bandura theory on mechanisms of moral 
disengagement (2004). In this theory, the author suggests that an individual’s disengagement from self-
sanctions can provide an explanation for violent behavior in some circumstances. 
6
 It is true that these individuals, eager to carry out violence, can play an important role at the base of the 
movement, since they can accomplish many violent activities without compromising the rest of the group. 
However, by its very nature and the difficulty of their control, it is not easy to be given access to 
resources and information needed to undertake major attacks. 
7
 This mechanism has been included in Figure 2 
